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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last three decades, scientists have made tremendous advancements in
the field of biotechnology.1 The advent of genetic engineering2 and recombinant
1

Generally, biotechnology is the manipulation of biological materials and processes.
SUSAN ALDRIDGE, THE THREAD OF LIFE 183 (1996). For the purposes of this paper, the term
biotechnology refers to the products and processes of isolating, preparing, and replicating
fragments of deoxyribonucleic acid (hereinafter DNA) and ribonucleic acid (hereinafter
RNA), and using DNA and RNA fragments to produce proteins. John M. Golden,
Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the
American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 113-14 (2001).
2
Genetic engineering is just one form of biotechnology. Genetic engineering allows for
the transfer of genes from one species into another. A gene is cut out of one organism, placed
in a vector, and the vector carries the cut gene into a host organism where the gene will be
cloned as the host organism replicates resulting in many copies of the cut gene and its
corresponding product. ALDRIDGE, supra note 1, at 103-11.
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DNA techniques3 in the 1970’s was responsible for much of this progress.
Biotechnology has opened up the possibility of new treatments for cancer, heart
disease, and other genetically based diseases.4 Patients' genetic information has
become part of their regular healthcare treatment. As genetic information becomes
more readily available, it will become a vital resource in the treatment of patients.
Doctors can use genetic information to detect patients’ risks of developing certain
diseases and prescribe preventative measures, identify disease carriers through
carrier screening, and treat diseases with pharmacogenomics, gene therapy, and
gene-based therapy.5 Not only does the biotechnology industry have the potential to
dramatically increase doctors’ ability to diagnose and cure many of the terrible
diseases that afflict millions in this country, it also promises to be very profitable.6
In 1999 alone, the biotechnology industry generated $20 billion in revenue.7
Increasing evidence suggests that the biotechnology industry’s interest in
generating revenue and the public’s desire to obtain the best healthcare may be at
odds.8 The patenting of genetic information is at the core of this debate. Most, if not
all, of the products of the biotech industry’s research are patentable. Historically,
patents have been justified on the grounds that they are needed to create an incentive
for researchers and companies to invest time and money in projects that have
uncertain outcomes. In the biotechnology arena, patents do not simply encourage
innovation and allow innovators to recoup their costs. Patents can also limit the
public’s access to valuable information that could benefit individuals and society.
This Note argues that current patent laws are not socially beneficial when applied to
biotechnology products.
The ultimate goal of patent law is to strike a balance between providing rewards
for invention, spurring new innovation, and ensuring the availability of the
innovations to the public.9 This balance is necessary and desirable because there is
always more than one stakeholder in a new technology or invention, particularly in
3

“The term recombinant DNA literally means the joining or recombining of two pieces of
DNA from two different species.” Who Owns Life? Biotech Primer, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF BIOETHICS ONLINE, at http://www.ajobonline.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter
Biotech Primer].
4

Genetics: The Future of Medicine, NIH Publication No. 00-4873, at 9, available at
http://www.genome.gov/Pages/EducationKit/brochure.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003)
[hereinafter Genetics: The Future of Medicine]. See Vida Foubister, Gene Patents Raise
Concerns for Researchers, Clinicians, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, Feb. 21, 2000, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/prsb0221.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
5
Genetics: The Future of Medicine, supra note 4, at 8-11. This publication provides
definitions and functions of all these treatment options.
6

Margaret Graham Tebo, The Big Gene Profit Machine, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2001, at 46.

7

The Economic Contributions of the Biotechnology Industry to the U.S. Economy, Ernst &
Young Economics Consulting and Quantitative Analysis, May 2000, at 4.
8

Raphael Lewis & Jamal E. Watson, Biotech Protest Draws 2,500, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
27, 2000, at B1.
9
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533-535 (1966). See Golden, supra note 1, at 104-07.
See also Clarisa Long, Patents and Cumulative Information, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y. 229,
229 (2000).
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the case of DNA patents.10 The stakeholders include the private biotechnology and
pharmaceutical firms, the scientists and researchers, the federal government, the
insurance industry, and the public. Each stakeholder has a unique interest. This
Note will focus on the interest of the inventors, who will become the patent holders,
and the public. The public’s interest lies in having access to the best healthcare at a
reasonable cost. This interest often conflicts with that of the inventor patent holder
when the patent holder can use the patent to garner excessive profits thus limiting
access.
This Note demonstrates that the balance among the various interests of these
particular stakeholders is not being met. The next section of this Note provides a
background on the patentability of DNA. Part III surveys and explain the recent
flood of gene patents into the Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter PTO). Part
IV discusses the public interest in human gene patents. Part V demonstrates that the
patenting of human DNA presents unique problems that do not arise in the patenting
of other inventions. Finally, Part VI discusses an approach to balance these interests
and the need for congressional action to achieve a balance between encouraging
innovation and providing the most socially beneficial health outcomes.
II. THE PATENTABILITY OF DNA
It is undisputed that DNA (including genes, gene fragments, and their
corresponding products) can be patented.11 This section of the Note briefly reviews
the history of DNA-related patents.
Congressional patent power derives from Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the
United States Constitution. This clause reads: “[t]he Congress shall have
power…[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”12 Based upon this power, Congress enacted the Patent Act.13 The
Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”14 The requirements of the title include that the invention
10

In this Note, the terms “human DNA patents,” “human gene patents” or “gene patents”
will be used interchangeably. “Gene patent is a broad term that refers to the patenting of
either a process that involves the isolation of DNA (where DNA refers to either DNA or
associated materials such as RNA) as well as to a chemical substance related to DNA.” Gene
Patenting, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub
/category/2314.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Gene Patenting].
11

The PTO has issued 6,000 gene-related patents. There are 20,000 applications related to
genes currently pending before the PTO. Julie Grisham, New Rules For Gene Patents,
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, Sept., 2000, Vol. 18, No. 9, at 921. See also Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
12

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

13

35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). See Donna M. Gitter, International
Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European
Union: An Argument For Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1623, 1637 (2001).
14

35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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be statutory patentable subject matter,15 that the patent application include a written
description referred to as the enablement requirement,16 and that the invention be
novel,17 non-obvious,18 and useful.19 This patentability analysis is used for all
inventions.20
Genes are considered patentable subject matter.21 When genes have been isolated
and purified22 they are considered a composition of matter that is covered by the
Patent Act.23 However, the Patent Act “does not cover the gene as it occurs in
nature.”24 In other words, an isolated and purified gene or segment of DNA is
considered a new composition of matter.25 In this way, patent law does not treat
DNA differently from other chemical compounds that are compositions of matter
because it does not occur naturally in this form.26
Applicants for gene patents can meet the enablement provision by giving a
written description of the invention that would enable the invention to be made and
used by someone with “ordinary skill in the art.”27 The requirement that the
invention be novel simply means that it must not have been done before in exactly
the same way.28 In addition, the form of the DNA cannot have been described in a
previous patent or patent application.29 The non-obviousness element requires that
the invention not be obvious to an ordinary person skilled in the art of the invention’s

15

Id.

16

35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).

17

35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).

18

35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).

19

35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).

20
John J. Doll, Biotechnology: The Patenting of DNA, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, Vol. 280,
No. 5364, at 689.
21

Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (January 5, 2001).

22

Isolation and purification of DNA refers to the process by which a gene is isolated from
its natural state and processed through purifying steps that separate the gene from other
molecules it is naturally associated with. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at
1093.
23

Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093.

24

Id. Explaining that concerns about humans infringing on patents because their body
contains the patented gene are unfounded.
25

35 U.S.C. § 101. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093.

26

Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095.

27

35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). John J. Doll, Talking Gene Patents, Scientific
American, Aug. 2001, available at http://www.sciam.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
28

35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Doll, supra note 27, at http://www.sciam.com.

29

Id.
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particular field.30 Gene patents meet the non-obvious requirement if they have not
been described as a composition of matter prior to the patent application.31
The PTO has recently changed the utility requirement for gene patents. In
January 2001, the PTO established new patent utility guidelines32 that primarily
address utility standards for gene and gene fragment patents.33 The new guidelines
came in response to criticisms that too many gene patents were being issued.
Although the new guidelines uphold the general concept that genes can be patented,
they raise the utility bar.34 There are two tests under the 2001 guidelines; however,
only one test has to be satisfied in order to meet the utility requirement.35
The first test is the Specific, Substantial, and Credible Utility Test. This test
states that a utility is “specific” when it is particular to the subject matter claimed.36
“Substantial utility” requires a “real world” use, which means that the immediate
benefit must be identified and not need more research.37 Lastly, a “credible” utility is
determined by whether a person with ordinary skill in the art would accept that the
invention “is currently available for such use.”38 The second test is the WellEstablished Utility Test. This test incorporates the Specific, Substantial and Credible
Utility test, but allows applicants to meet the requirements by demonstrating that the
function of the gene or its protein is connected to a gene or protein that has been
identified and is well known.39 This new utility standard significantly eliminates
applications where the only claimed utility is that the invention can be used for
further study of its own utility.40
Historically, the PTO generally rejected patent applications involving living
organisms.41 This trend ended in 1980, when the Supreme Court reversed a PTO
rejection of a patent application for a genetically modified bacteria.42 In Diamond v.
30

35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Doll, supra note 27, at http://www.sciam.com.

31

Warren Kaplan, Biotech Patenting 101, available at http://www.genewatch.org/genewatch/articles/14-3patenting.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
32

Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093.

33

The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH REV.
0008, ¶ 1 (Feb. 28, 2001), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001dltr
0008.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2003) [hereinafter The Fate of Gene Patents].
34

Id. at ¶ 3.

35

Id. at ¶ 10-11.

36

Id.

37

Id. “This rule derives from the US Supreme Court’s position in Brenner that a chemical
or a chemical process is not sufficiently useful if its only use is as an object of scientific
research.” Id. at ¶ 13 discussing Brenner, 353 U.S. at 535.
38

The Fate of Gene Patents, supra note 33 at ¶ 14.

39

Id. at ¶ 15-17.

40

Id. at ¶ 25.

41

JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY: HARNESSING THE GENE AND REMAKING
WORLD 42 (1998).

THE

42

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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Chakrabarty,43 the Supreme Court found that the bacterium was a “nonnaturally
occurring manufacture or composition of matter — a product of human ingenuity”44
and was covered by the Patent Act.45 In rendering the decision, the Supreme Court
did “not distinguish between ‘living and inanimate things…’ but [] distinguish[ed]
between ‘products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.’”46
The Court emphasized that Congress intended patents to cover broad subject matters
“includ[ing] anything under the sun that is made by man.”47 Many believe that the
decision in Chakrabarty, although it did not address human DNA patents
specifically, expanded the scope of patentable biotech subject matter.48 The
Chakrabarty decision then gave rise to Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,49
where the federal circuit relied on the “human ingenuity” standard from Chakrabarty
to uphold the patenting of DNA sequences.50
When issuing human DNA patents, the PTO has granted three basic types:
structure patents, function patents, and process patents.51 Structure patents cover the
isolated and purified molecule as a new composition of matter.52 Function patents
are issued when the applicant has invented a use for the DNA, such as a diagnostic
test.53 Process patents typically are given when an applicant has found a new method
of isolating, purifying, analyzing, modifying, or synthesizing the DNA.54 Human
DNA patents usually fall under a composition of matter (structure) patents or process
patents.55
The Patent and Trademark Office has stated,
[P]atents do not confer ownership of genes, genetic information, or
sequences. The patent system promotes progress by securing a complete
disclosure of an invention to the public, in exchange for the inventor’s

43

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Kaplan, supra note 31, at http://www.gene-watch.org/genewatch/articles/143patenting.html (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313).
47

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.

48

Kaplan, supra
3patenting.html.

note

31,

at

http://www.gene-watch.org/genewatch/articles/14-

49

927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

50

Id. at 1218.

51

David B. Resnik, DNA Patents and Human Dignity, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 152, 153-54
(2001).
52

Id.

53

Id. at 154.

54

Id.

55

Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095. See Doll, supra note 20, at 689.
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legal right to exclude other people from making, using, offering for sale,
selling, or importing the composition for a limited time.56
III. THE PREVALENCE OF HUMAN GENE PATENTS
According to several sources, the PTO has issued approximately 6,000 gene
related patents in the United States.57 Of these 6,000 patents, more than 1,000 of
them are related to human genes and human gene variations.58 The PTO also has
approximately 20,000 pending gene-related applications.59 The sequencing of the
human genome,60 advances made in genetic engineering, the creation of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,61 and the cooperation between the academic world
and the biotech industry62 have all spurred the development of the biotech industry.
This, in turn, has led to a dramatic increase in the number of applications for, and
grants of, gene patents.63
The Human Genome Project (hereinafter HGP) began in 1990.64 The goal of the
HGP was to sequence the entire human genome.65 The HGP was an international
collaboration spearheaded by the National Institute of Health (hereinafter NIH).66
HGP was publicly funded and made the information it obtained available to the
public.67 At the same time that the HGP was sequencing the human genome, so was
a private corporation, Celera Genomics Group (hereinafter Celera). On June 26,
2000, HGP and Celera simultaneously announced that both had completed an entire

56

Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093-1094.

57

Grisham, supra note 11, at 921. Andrew Pollack, U.S. Hopes to Stem Rush Toward
Patenting Genes, THE PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), June 28, 2002, at 18. See Gitter,
supra note 13, at 1624. This gene patent estimation differs than the one give by John J. Doll,
director of biotechnology for the PTO. When asked about the number of genes patented and
applications pending, John J. Doll stated, “[t]he only number that I have is a guesstimate: since
1980 we have granted more that 20,000 patents on genes or other gene-related molecules [for
humans and other organisms]. And we also know that we have more than 25,000 applications
outstanding that actually claim genes or related molecules.” Doll, supra note 27, at
http://www.sciam.com.
58

Grisham, supra note 11, at 921.

59

Id.

60

J. Craig Vetner et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, SCIENCE, Feb. 16, 2001,
Volume 291, at 1304.
61

The Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164 (1982).

62

Golden, supra note 1, at 101-91 (discussing the interaction between private
biotechnology firms, the federal government, and the academic world).
63

Grisham, supra note 11, at 921. Pollack, supra note 57, at 18.

64

Genetics: The Future of Medicine, supra note 4, at 1.

65

The Human Genome Project: New Tools for Tomorrow’s Health Research, NIH
Publication No. 32-3190 (September 1992) at 9-11.
66

Id. at 13.

67

Genetics: The Future of Medicine, supra note 4, at 1.
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working draft of the human genome.68 In February 2001, both groups published the
human genome sequence in Science.69 This was nearly two years ahead of
schedule.70 This early completion was the result of changes in the way genes were
found and DNA was sequenced.71
The research done by HGP has contributed greatly to the growth of gene patents
because it allowed researchers to have use of the HGP sequences. Researchers then
matched the HGP sequences to known homologous sequences in other organisms.72
The known function of the homologous sequence is then used to obtain a patent on
the human gene.73 This research accelerated the process of identifying genes
tremendously and led to an increase in patent applications.74 Before this type of
high-speed gene sequencing and other techniques were developed, scientists would
study a protein, discover its function, and work backwards to isolate the gene.75 It
took years to isolate one gene.76 The new methods “are allowing genes or fragments
of genes to be discovered en mass, without knowing the functions of the proteins
produced by the genes.”77
The increasing number of patents issued is also due, in part, to the formation of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.78 The Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982 gave this court exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals of patent cases
originally heard in the federal district courts.79 This led to uniformity in the law and
allowed for easier issuance of patents.80
New trends in patents are the privatization of biomedical research and more
vigorous patent enforcement.81 Historically, medical and academic communities
shared scientific information related to healthcare believing that this was the best

68

Nicholas Wade, Genetic Code of Human Life Is Cracked by Scientists: A Shared
Success, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000 at A1.
69

Vetner, supra note 60, at 1304.

70

Genetics: The Future of Medicine, supra note 4, at 1.

71

Id. at 1, 3.

72

Gene Patenting, supra note 10, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/
2314.html.
73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Pollack, supra note 57, at 18.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

The Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164 (1982).

79

Id. Golden, supra note 1, at 125.

80

Golden, supra note 1, at 125.

81

Foubister, supra note 4, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/prsb
0221.htm.
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way to promote progress and benefit public healthcare.82 The federal government
sponsored basic research that took place primarily in universities and other public
institutions such as the NIH.83 This model of publicly funded research enabled
scientists to have immediate access to newly developed technologies and the most
recent research discoveries in the field of biomedical research.84 In essence,
biomedical research occurred in the public and stayed in the public domain.
The academic environment that spurred the wealth of public information changed
in 1980 when Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act and the Wydler-Stevenson Act.85
Congress passed the acts to promote commercial development of basic
biotechnological research.86 Bayh-Dole permitted and encouraged universities and
other institutions to patent their federally funded research and to transfer their
technology to the private sector.87 Stevenson-Wydler mandated that federal
laboratories actively engage in cooperative research with other laboratories including
those in private industry, and requires the federal laboratories to set aside a portion of
their budgets for technology transfer activities.88 The goal of the Acts is to increase
the number of commercialized products that could be derived from the federally
funded basic research and keep American inventions under American control.89
IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN HUMAN GENE PATENTS
A. The Source
One of the fundamental differences between human gene patents and patents on
other scientific and medical innovations is that the source of raw material for the
gene patents is human tissue.90 This is especially significant when researchers are
82

Gene Patents Detrimental to Care, Training, Research, CAP Advocacy, at
http://www.cap.org/html/advocacy/issues/genetalk.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
83
Kristen Philipkoski, New Quest: Mapping Gene Patents, March 6, 2001 at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42214,00.html. “[] 71.6% of citations to research
papers in biotechnology patents are to publicly funded research….” Golden, supra note 1, at
117. Twenty-five percent of genomics companies report that their product streams would
have been blocked if it were not for academic research.
84

Foubister, supra note 4, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/prs
b0221.htm.
85

The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517; The Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Agreement of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480.
86

Id.

87

Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE, 698, 698 (1998).
88

The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480.
Technology transfer is the formal transferring of scientific research discoveries and innovation
that occurred in the universities or federal laboratories to the commercial sector.
89

Golden, supra note 1, at 120.

90

Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Non-Obviousness Standard for Gene Patents:
Protecting Biomedical Research From the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 143
(2000).
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looking at disease-related genes. Oftentimes, patients who are battling a devastating
genetic illness are the ones who contribute the genetic material that later becomes
patented.91
Some of these patients consent to provide the samples while others do not.92 In
either case, the samples help generate enormous profits for those who patent human
genes.93 Some ethicists, activists, and advocacy groups contend that patents should
not be given at all for human tissue.94 These groups are concerned that corporations
are selling innovations, that contain individual patient’s cellular material, to the
public and maybe even to the patients themselves.95 Thus, the important public
investment in the products, and technological innovations developed using human
tissue, are very powerful public interests.
B. Life-Saving Innovation
Gene patents, like other health-related patents, are a matter of heightened public
interest because the health of the public is at stake. The controversies surrounding
gene patents are not simply debates about legal or scientific policy. Rather, gene
patenting is a vital public policy issue that needs to be addressed.96
Scientists estimate that over 4,000 diseases stem from mutated genes.97
Approximately 1,800 individual genes have been linked to a specific disease as of
April 2000.98 Genes hold the necessary information for the development of
therapies, drugs, and diagnostic tests that can provide life-saving information and
innovation.99 Human gene patent innovation can be a matter of life or death or, at a
minimum, about improving the quality of life for individuals with genetic diseases.100
Because of this distinction, human gene patents contrast dramatically with typical
patents for products like flat-screen TVs.

91
Peter Gorner, Parents Suing Over Patenting of Genetic Test They Say the Researchers
They Assisted are Trying to Profit From a Test for a Rare Disease, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2000,
at 1, available at 2000 WL 3735425 (describing a suit by parents who provided researchers
with tissue samples of their son and daughter while they were alive and pieces of their brains
when they died).
92

Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936
(1991). The plaintiff’s blood was used to create a cell line that was patented by a physician
and the rights were sold to a biotech company without the plaintiff’s knowledge.
93

Tebo, supra note 6, at 47.

94

Council For Responsible Genetics, No Patents on Life!, at http://www.genewatch.org/programs/patents.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
95

Id.

96

Seth Shulman, Toward Sharing the Genome, MIT’s TECH. REV. 6067, (Sept. 1, 2000),
available at 2000 WL 11628629.
97

Primer: Genome and Genetic Research, Patent Protection and 21st Century Medicine,
at 16 (July 2000) at http://www.bio.org/genomics/primer.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
98

Id.

99

Genetics: The Future of Medicine, supra note 4, at 8-13.

100

Id.
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C. The Public Investment
The American public has paid for much of the pioneering research and
development that has allowed for the enormous progress made in the area of
biotechnology.101 Although the HGP made a huge contribution to the biotechnology
industry,102 it cost the public $3 billion.103 In 2001 alone, the government gave the
NIH and eight other Health and Human Service agencies $1.2 billion dollars to
support public health, health services, and health policy research.104 The government
also indirectly funds private biotechnology research through tax relief, tax credits
and patent protection.105 While the private biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industries are largely responsible for turning basic research into a commercial end
product, it is the publicly funded initial research that allows the industry to move
forward.106 This initial investment gives the public a stake in patents on human DNA
that is not present with patents on other inventions.
D. Downstream v. Upstream Research
Human gene patents often protect the gene, the protein product of the gene, and
the gene fragments that are contained within the gene.107 This kind of information is
considered basic research and provides the data that is necessary for making end
products such as drugs, diagnostic tests, and other treatments based on genes and
their products.108
The gene comprises the building blocks of life and, if mutated, can cause
devastating diseases.109 When scientists who study the affect of genes excise DNA
from human blood or tissue, their aim is to make an exact replica of what exists in
the body. The researcher’s goal is to have the gene function (or fail to function as
may be the case with a mutation) exactly as it does in the human body. The
researchers do not want to modify or enhance the gene at this point. The gene itself
is basic to the development of further research (i.e., by understanding how the gene
functions in its unaltered state, scientists have the foundation for studying how
various interventions alter the expression of the gene.) If predictions are correct and
it is possible to cure many diseases by correcting the mutated genes or by using gene
products as drug therapies, it is necessary to do as much research as possible into the
functioning of genes.110 Under current patent law, inventors can own the rights to
101

Abbey S. Meyers, “Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide:” A Response, 3
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 581, 581-582 (1996).
102

See supra Part III.

103

Shulman, supra note 96, at 6067.

104

Highlights of the President’s FY 2002 Preliminary Budget, American Society for
Microbiology, at http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/budget2002.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
105

Golden, supra note 1, at 138.

106

Philipkoski, supra note 83, at http://www.lwired.com/news/print/0,1294,42214,00.

107

Doll, supra note 27, at http://www.sciam.com.

108

See supra Part I.

109

Genetics: The Future of Medicine, supra note 4, at 2.

110

Id. at 8-11.
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genes, the proteins they produce, and their gene fragments, thereby preventing or
making it costly for other scientists to study the genes and perhaps discover valuable
medical or therapeutic uses for the genes.111 When this happens, medical progress is
inhibited. In this way, genes are being treated as products in and of themselves
instead of guides to future product discovery. Some compare gene patenting to
“trying to gain ownership of the alphabet, rather than of a novel or play.”112
When basic research of this kind is patented so far upstream, it covers inventions
upon which breakthrough research and end products could be built.113 As one author
put it, “[o]ne firm’s research tool may be another firm’s end product.”114 If the
licensing and transaction costs are too high, these valuable downstream innovations
will never take place.115 Arguably, patent holders will use their proprietary
information to engage in further innovation; however, “[n]ot all patentees who obtain
patents on basic research results will have the capacity or interest in conducting
further research to turn their patented inventions into commercial end-products.”116
This causes a dual problem. The upstream patent holders are not able to or are not
interested in making commercially relevant end products with the gene patents they
hold,117 but in an effort to make money, they charge licensing fees or make exclusive
licensing arrangements that limit the amount of research that can be done on a
particular gene.118 As Clarisa Long has stated:
Patents have been a great source of concern for academic and basic
researchers who fear that proprietary rights to basic research results will
hamper the progress of science, stifle the free flow of new knowledge and
the dissemination of research results, and chill the research efforts of
scientists who fear infringement liability. 119
Quite simply, patents limit the availability and raise the cost of the therapeutic and
diagnostic end products because the patents are owned too far upstream in the
research and development process. This is a great concern because human genes
have both basic and applied uses.120 Unquestionably patents are critical to
111

Doll, supra note 27, at http://www.sciam.com.

112

Pollack, supra note 57, at 18.

113

Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J.
823, 824 (2000).
114
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of
Large-Scale DNA Sequencing, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557, 571(1996).
115

Long, supra note 113, at 827-31.

116

Id. at 826.

117

Id.

118

Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 571. Pollack, supra note 57, at 18 (“Most patent holders
want people to do research on their genes in hopes of finding a drug, which would bring in
really big royalties” Id.).
119

Long, supra note 9, at 229-230.

120

Id. A basic use is one in which the gene would be used strictly for research purpose;
applied uses include the development of a marketable product such as a drug, test, or other
medical therapy.
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innovation, however, the point at which genes and genetic information should be
subject to patents is debatable. The stage in which patents are issued can affect the
ability to make affordable end products. Strong protection too early in the process
has the potential to retard further development, yet at the same time it rewards basic
research inventors121 and gives them an incentive to take on risky and expensive
research.122 If there are fewer useful products for the public, the balance between
rewarding innovation and getting that innovation to the public will not occur.
E. “The Tragedy of the Anticommons”
Gene patents can be very broad.123 In Brenner v. Manson,124 the Supreme Court
recognized the danger of issuing patents with broad applications, especially in areas
that are “vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable.”125 The area of genes qualifies as
vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable, and there is the danger that gene patents
could “confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without [a]
compensating benefit to the public.”126
When a human gene patent holder receives a patent, it covers any commercial
use of the gene and the gene product.127 The patent holder only has to describe one
function of the gene or its protein product, and if any future uses or functions are
developed with the gene, the patent still covers those uses.128 Gene patents typically
do meet utility requirements but their uses may not be optimal. These broad patents
cause a problem that Heller and Eisenberg two well known authors in this area, refer
to as the “tragedy of the anticommons” for biomedical research.129

121

Id. at 237-242.

122

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 698.

123

Grisham, supra note 11, at 921. Quoting Harold Varmus, former of director of the NIH
and current president of Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, who discussed the
extensive rights given to gene patent holders. Foubister, supra note 4, at http://www.amaassn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/prsb0221.htm (“The Patent and Trademark Office has
issued patents with far too broad a right to patents holders; they essentially end up owning a
disease rather than some specific development for a test,” said Michael Watson, PhD, a
professor of pediatrics and genetics at Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis.).
Gina Shaw, Does the Gene Patenting Stampede Threaten Science?, AAMC Reporter, Feb.
2000, Volume 9, Number 5, available at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/feb2000/
gene.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
124

383 U.S. 519 (1966).

125

Id. at 534 (denying a patent application for a chemical whose usefulness had not been
shown to the PTO).
126

Id.

127

Doll, supra note 20, at 690. See also David P. Hamilton, Getting a Patent: Biotech
Firms Are Scrambling to Win Exclusive Rights To Newly Discovered Genes, WALL ST. J., Oct.
15, 2001 at R6.
128

The new use can be patented but the original patent holder will still be owed a royalty
fee for each time the gene or its product is used in any way. Doll, supra note 20, at 690.
129

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 698.
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When people hold a resource in common they tend to overuse it because they
lack any incentive to conserve the resource. This overuse is referred to as a “tragedy
of the commons.”130 Privatization131 is often used to solve this problem, but when a
scarce resource is over-privatized the result can be a “tragedy of the
anticommons.”132 The “tragedy of the anticommons” results in the underuse of a
resource because too many people are excluded from using the resource.133
Underuse is occurring with human gene patents. Once a gene or gene fragment is
patented, any further research using the patented materials must go through the
patent holder.134 These patents are so far upstream and so broad in their scope that
they stifle future research.135 This problem is especially pervasive as it applies to the
patenting of human genes because the information and research needed to produce
an end product is cumulative.136 Oftentimes, more than one gene, gene fragment, or
gene product is needed to make a final product such as a genetic diagnostic test or
therapeutic proteins.137 Recent genetic research has shown the idea that a single gene
being responsible for a disease is the exception, not the rule.138 Instead, most
diseases are polygenic, meaning that multiple genes are involved in the manifestation
of a disease.139 If a patent exists for each of the several pieces of genetic material
needed to develop a product, the cost and time of developing the end product may be
prohibitive.140
One of the purposes of giving patents is to motivate inventors to design around
the current patented invention.141 The “design around” concept leads to competition
and progress that betters the public.142 However, genes cannot be “designed around”

130
Id. The “tragedy of the commons” was used by Garrett Hardin to explain
overpopulation, air pollution, and species extinction.
131

Privatization describes the transfer or shift from the public or government sector into
the private sector.
132

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 698.

133

Id.

134

Doll, supra note 20, at 690.

135

Long, supra note 113, at 824.

136
Long, supra note 9, at 237. See John H. Barton, Reforming the Patent System, 287
SCIENCE Mar. 17, 2000, at 1933 (describing that new pharmaceutical products are complicated
and slowed because of the large number of patent holders that must be negotiated with at the
various steps of making the final product).
137

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 699.

138

Matthew Albright, The Human Genome Projects: Help or Hindrance for Gene
Patenting?, GENEWATCH, Vol. 14 at http://www.gene-watch.org/genewatch/articles/143humangenome.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
139

Id.

140

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 698-701.

141

DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 67 (1998).
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because no substitute exists for them.143 If researchers want to work on a cure for a
genetically-based disease, they must use the gene that causes the disease. Patents
can prevent these scientists from gaining access to unique and valuable genetic
information.
V. THE IMPACTS OF GENE PATENTS ON THE PROVISION OF HEALTHCARE
A. The Increased Cost
Gene patents have the potential to make healthcare more expensive and therefore,
out of reach for many Americans. Individual testing for predisposition to genetic
diseases can be extremely expensive.144 For example, the Chicago Tribune reported
that Missouri Medicaid will pay eleven dollars toward a test that screens for Downs
Syndrome.145 The patent holders want to collect nine dollars for each test
performed.146 This leaves the healthcare provider with two dollars to cover the costs
of administering the test and interpreting the results. One doctor stated that he will
be forced to stop offering the test or have to ask patients to pay the difference
between the two dollars he has left and the actual cost of performing the test.147
Gene patents create a monopoly and under current licensing practices many patients
could not afford to have “access to new genetic information about themselves, their
children, and their future children.”148 It might not seem like much to ask a patient
for ten to twenty-five dollars to cover one test, but when you consider the high
number of tests that would be needed for a complete genetic screening, the cost
skyrockets.149
There is concern in the medical field “that genetic testing of patients could
become prohibitively expensive if each gene is patented.”150 Currently, researchers
are working on “chips” that could screen for 200-300 genetic diseases at a time, but
if each gene is patented and each patent holder charges a royalty fee, this screening

143

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 700.

144

Gorner, supra note 91, at 1.

145

Ronald Kotulak, Taking License with Your Genes Biotech Firms Say They Need
Protection, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1999 at 1.
146

Shulman, supra note 96, at 6067.

147

Id.

148

Foubister, supra note 4, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/
prsb0221.htm. A discussion of what parents should be able to know about their children's
genetic make-up and the privacy issues surrounding that issue are beyond the scope of this
article. For a discussion see DENA S. DAVIS, GENETIC DILEMMAS: REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY, PARENTAL CHOICES, AND CHILDREN'S FUTURES 69-86 (2001).
149

Whether insurance would or should cover the cost of genetic screening is beyond the
scope of this article. There has been much debate recently surrounding genetic privacy and
how genetic information would be used by insurance companies. See Thomas H. Murray,
Genetics and the Moral Mission of Healthcare, Hastings Center Report, November-December,
1992. Mark A. Rothstein and Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing, Genetic Medicine and
Managed Care, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849 (1999).
150

Pollack, supra note 57, at 18.
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device will be very costly. As stated earlier, it is thought that over 4,000 diseases
stem from mutated genes, and thus far, 1,792 individual genes have been linked to a
disease.151 Tests for individual genetic diseases tend not to be cost prohibitive;
however, the cost of multiple tests could become so expensive that most individuals
could not afford to be tested.152
Gene patents not only raise the price of screening tests for diseases like Downs
Syndrome, but also increase the cost of drugs that are made with gene products. 1214% of the cost of a drug is due to the royalties that have to be paid to patent
holders.153 As Jeffrey Kahn, the director of the Center for Bioethics at the University
of Minnesota, has said, gene patenting “has the potential to create the haves and
have-nots in terms of genetic information about health.”154
Those in favor of broad patents argue that part of the reward and incentive to
make their products is the ability to make a profit and recoup the costs of research.
However, patents on the human gene are a unique situation. As I discussed
previously, the public has funded much of the research.155 For example, many of the
genes and the gene products that are currently being patented are the result of the
publicly funded $3 billion Human Genome Project.156 In effect, the public pays
twice, first by funding the research and then, because of the monopoly the gene
patentee holds, by having to pay for the end products.
1. Monopoly Power
The granting of patents creates legalized monopolies designed to encourage
innovation. In the case of genes, the creation of such monopolies is having an
undesirable and contradictory effect.157 The broad monopolies are financial
disincentives for others to try and improve and expand their genetic research.
Patents prevent others from engaging in cutting edge research and impede
competition that could drive down healthcare costs.158 These monopolies appear
even more dangerous when one considers that “four private companies could own
half of the human genome.”159 The human genome project revealed the true size of
the human genome, which was much smaller than scientists anticipated, therefore,

151
Primer: Genome and Genetic Research, Patent Protection and 21st Century Medicine,
supra note 97, at http://www.bio.org/genomics/primer.html.
152

Gorner, supra note 91, at 1.

153

Pollack, supra note 57, at 18.

154

Foubister, supra note 4, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/
prsb0221.htm.
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See supra Part IV, C. The Public Investment.
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Gorner, supra note 91, at 1.
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See supra Part IV, D. Downstream v. Upstream Research.
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See supra Part V A.1. Monopoly Power.
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See Albright, supra note 138, at http://www.gene-watch.org/genewatch/articles/143humangenome.html.
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corporations own a higher percentage of the human genome than expected.160 Some
examples may serve as a tool to explain the impact of gene patents.
a. Example: Myriad Genetics Inc. & BRCA1 & BRCA2161
Myriad Genetics Inc. holds the United States’ patents for the hereditary breast
cancer genes commonly referred to as BRCA1 and BRCA2.162 The discovery of
BRCA1, the first gene to be identified as predisposing women to hereditary breast
cancer, was made through international collaboration and the open exchange of
information;163 however, Myriad alone holds the patent.164 As researchers got closer
to isolating the gene, Myriad’s researchers, using work that had already been done,
applied for the patent on the basis that they were the first to complete the sequencing
of the gene (BRCA1).165 In addition, much of the work on BRCA2, for which
Myriad also holds the patent, took place in Britain at the Sanger Centre in Cambridge
and the Institute of Cancer Research (hereinafter ICR).166 Myriad filed its patent
application for BRCA2 hours before ICR published its discovery in the journal
Nature.167
The BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents provide Myriad with exclusive rights to
commercialize laboratory testing services, diagnostic test kits, and therapeutic
products that use the BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA sequences.168 Myriad can decide
which labs will do the tests, how many tests will be done, and at what price.169 In the
United States Myriad’s monopoly enables it to charge between $250-500 to screen
for the occurrence of the mutation.170 For the full sequencing of both BRCA genes
which would check for any mutation in either gene, Myriad charges about $2,400.171
160

Id.

161

BRCA1 is U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999, 5,710,001, and 5,747,282 (issued Jan. 20, 1998)
and BRCA2 is U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (issued Nov. 17, 1998) and 6,033,857 (issued Mar.
7, 2000).
162

In May 2001, Myriad announced that it received patents for BRCA1 and BRCA2 in
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and from the European Patent Organization. The impact on
the cost of hereditary breast cancer screening was not mentioned. Myriad Genetics Awarded
Cancer Gene Patents, BIOTECH PATENT NEWS, May 1, 2001, Vol. 15, Issue 5, available at
2001 WL 17381672.
163
Patenting Genes – Stifling Research and Jeopardising Healthcare, GeneWatch UK, at 1
(Apr. 2001) available at http://www.genewatch.org/Publications/Patenting/Patents.pdf (last
visited Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Patenting Genes – Stifling Research and Jeopardising
Healthcare].
164

Id. at 2.

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Id.

168

Id.
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Patenting Genes – Stifling Research and Jeopardising Healthcare, supra note 163, at 2.
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Id.
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Id.
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In the United Kingdom, ICR holds the patent to BRCA2 and does not charge a
licensing fee.172 Scientists at the Central Manchester Healthcare National Health
Service Trust (hereinafter NHS) in the United Kingdom calculated that screening for
a particular mutation known to occur in a patient’s family costs less than $140 in
their own laboratories.173 Full sequencing of both BRCA genes would cost about
$1,120.174 Because Myriad has applied for BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents in Europe, it
is pressuring NHS to pay royalties on the patented gene(s) although NHS had
developed its own tests for the breast cancer susceptibility genes.175 In Canada,
before Myriad received its Canadian patent,176 the cost for full sequencing was
around $1,200.177 In the U.S., where Myriad’s patents exist, the cost is nearly
double. Myriad will not have any competition in the U.S. for twenty years (the
length of the patent) since the hereditary breast cancer gene is needed to do the
screening and there is no way to invent around the gene. This is an example of how
a human gene patent can inflate the cost of healthcare.
b. Example 2: Canavan Disease
In the fall of 1998, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
announced its recommendation “that all Ashkenazi Jewish women should undergo
DNA testing for Canavan carrier status.”178 Canavan disease is a genetic disorder
that causes degeneration of the brain.179 Those doctors who fail to test for the disease
face negligence liability if a patient has a child with the disease without being
tested.180
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Id.
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Id.
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Patenting Genes – Stifling Research and Jeopardising Healthcare, supra note 163, at 3.
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Id.

176

In May, 2001, Myriad announced that it received patents for BRCA1 and BRCA2 in
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and from the European Patent Organization the impact on the
cost of hereditary breast cancer screening was not mentioned. Myriad Genetics Awarded
Cancer Gene Patents, supra note 162, at 2001 WL 17381672.
177
Who Owns Life?, Part Two, The Impact of Gene Patents on Health Care and Medical
Research: The Case of Breast Cancer Genetic Screening, Mar. 21, 2000, at
http://www.radio.cbc.ca/programs/thismorning/features/life_2.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2003).
178

Gorner, supra note 91, at 1.

179

Mary Kugler, Gene Patent: For Mankind’s Good, or For Profit? Jan. 12, 2001,
About.com Guide to Rare/Orphan Diseases, available at http://www.rarediseases.about.com/
library/weekly/aa011201a.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). Canavan disease results from a
lack of the enzyme aspartoacylase (ASPA). ASPA is encoded by the gene of the same name.
Gene Patent Leads to Legal Action, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/3358.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). Life
expectancy is between the ages 10-15 and there is no cure at this time. Gorner, supra note 91,
at 1.
180

Gorner, supra note 91, at 1.
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A few weeks after the announcement, Miami Children’s Hospital began
enforcing its 1997 patent for the Canavan gene. The search for the Canavan gene at
Miami Children's Hospital had been done at the insistence of, and with help from,
parents who lost two children to Canavan.181 In 1993, hospital researchers
discovered the gene and in 1997 they received the patent.182 The patent obtained by
Miami’s Children’s Hospital was “for the gene and its related applications, including
carrier and related testing.”183
In October 2000, the same parents who helped initiate the research for the disease
gene, along with the Canavan Foundation, Dor Yeshorim, and the National TaySachs and Allied Diseases Association, sued the researchers at Miami Children’s
Hospital as well as the hospital.184 In their lawsuit, the plaintiffs did “not directly
challenge the patent, but instead allege[d] that the researchers secretly obtained it
using the genetic information and financial resources that had been donated for the
public good and began charging royalties and limiting the availability of testing.”185
The plaintiffs sought to block Miami Children’s Hospital commercial use of the
Canavan gene and to recover damages derived from the collecting of royalties.186
The parents claimed that the patent, and its strictly enforced licensing, has
inhibited further research and closed down certain testing facilities.187 According to
the complaint, the Canavan Foundation “was forced to stop offering free genetic
screening … after being advised that it would have to pay royalties and comply with
other licensing terms.”188 Dor Yeshorim may also stop offering the test because of
the royalty fees.189 Prior to the patent enforcement by Miami Children's Hospital, the
cost of the test had been between eight and nine dollars.190 Miami Children’s
Hospital’s initial fee demand was twenty-five dollars; the hospital later decreased the
fee to $12.50. This increased fee had a huge impact on those who were offering the
screening free of charge. The test is given to those who are considering having
children and suspect that they are carriers of the disease.191 There are six million
181
Kugler, supra note 179, at http://www.rarediseases.about.com/library/weekly/
aa011201a.htm. The parents, the Greenbergs, began the chapter of National Tay-Sachs and
Allied Diseases Association in Chicago, they provided blood and tissue samples from their
children and convinced others to do the same, they began a registry to keep track of samples,
they also enlisted the help and support of the Dor Yeshorim and the Canavan Foundation.
182

Gorner, supra note 91, at 1.
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Jews in America.192 Of those six million, 90% are Ashkenazi and one in forty is a
silent carrier.193 These numbers indicate that it is very important that everyone be
tested.
Not only did Miami Children’s Hospital double the cost of the test, it also
restricted the number of labs that could perform the test and the number of tests that
could be done each year.194 The hospital defended this move on the grounds that it
could get one large company to buy its exclusive license and recoup its costs, and the
new owner could engage in widespread testing.195
Researchers can influence how much profit gene patents generate.196 The
patentees of the cystic fibrosis gene prohibited exclusive licensing and charge only
two dollars a test.197 The same is true with Tay-Sachs disease, another genetic
disease that affects Ashkenazi Jews.198 The reliance on benevolent researchers,
however, is not a solution that can be counted on, especially since many patents are
held by for-profit companies.
2. Multiplicity of Patents
Science has moved away from thinking that one gene is responsible for each
disease. “[B]oth genome projects have affirmed what many scientists have been
saying all along: the idea of a single function gene is a myth.”199 Likewise, scientists
have abandoned their previously held belief that there is one gene for each protein.200
In the Financial Times, Craig Vetner, president of Celera Genomics Inc., said, “[t]he
notion that one gene equals one disease or that one gene produces one key protein is
flying out the window.”201 Although there are some examples—Tay Sachs,
Canavan, Huntington’s, Downs Syndrome, and sickle cell anemia—where a single
gene is responsible for causing the disease, these are the minority.202 These single
gene diseases were probably first discovered because it is easier to establish the link
if there is only one gene involved. Now, it is believed that for many diseases
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Gorner, supra note 91, at 1.
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Albright, supra note 138, at http://www.gene-watch.org/genewatch/articles/143humangenome.html.
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Id.
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Profiting from the Human Genome, HARVARD MAGAZINE, July-Aug. 200, at 70,
available at http://www.harvardmagazine.com/archive/01ja/ja01_jhj_15.html (last visited Feb.
17, 2003) [hereinafter Profiting from the Human Genome].
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multiple genes work in coordination; therefore, in order to treat or cure a disease,
research and experimentation upon many genes and their functions is necessary.203
The abandonment of the single gene disease theory has triggered a unique
problem that could not have been contemplated when gene patents were first
issued—a problem of multiplicity. If more than one gene or gene failure is
responsible for a single disease, in order to find which genes are linked to which
diseases and to develop cures and treatments, researchers will need to be able to
experiment with numerous genes. The need to work with numerous genes means
finding numerous patentees and paying numerous royalties and/or licensing fees.
At this point in time the number of genes in the human genome is unknown.
Scientists at the Human Genome Project and the Celera project have estimated that
the number is between 30,000 and 40,000.204 With so few genes to work with and a
patent system that does not encourage sharing information, new research is
difficult.205 There is a possibility that most of the human genome is, or is about to
become patented. Over 1,000 human gene patents already exist and more than
20,000 are pending.206 Researchers who are working on cutting edge medical
science may have to go through ten to fifteen patent holders, negotiate licensing, and
pay fees, in order to do their work. Even some big drug companies are worried
about these obstacles and oppose gene patenting.207 To develop a marketable end
product, drug companies often use five to seven genes.208 The need to go through
multiple patent holders generates numerous hurdles. Patentees may refuse to deal
with the researchers and entire projects could be halted. The transaction costs of
having to go through multiple patent holders make it more expensive to do research
resulting in more expensive end products or impeding the development of new
products altogether. These costs will be passed down until they reach the
consumer.209 The multiplicity of patents increases the cost to researchers and
consumers beyond what was intended to be reasonable rewards for the patentees’
innovations.
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Future progress and public health depend on researchers and clinicians having
access to genetic information so discoveries can be made as quickly as possible.
Multiple patent holders impede this progress.
B. The Inhibition of Research
The PTO contends that gene patents do not stifle research stating that, “[t]he
incentive to make discoveries and inventions is generally spurred, not inhibited, by
patents.”210 Increasingly, scientists and policy-makers are challenging this position
arguing that gene patents are not only increasing the cost of research, they are
making it harder for researchers to get access to the latest information and, in some
cases, stopping the research all together.
[A]s more of the genetic code is mapped and deciphered, it’s frequently
becoming more difficult-not easier-to conduct further research and gain
more information. With genetic patents staking private claims to huge
chunks of the code, researchers and clinicians are finding their genetic
research and diagnostic efforts thwarted by various restrictions imposed
by commercial, and in some instances, academic, patent holders.211
The necessity of being the first to apply for the patent in order to obtain the
patent has caused some researchers to keep valuable information from one another.
Professor Jonathan King of the Massachusetts Institute for Technology has said:
“[p]atent attorneys regularly advise researchers to restrict their presentations to
colleagues, don’t show your work, don’t show your notebook, don’t give that talk, so
as not to jeopardize the planned patent submissions. This has reversed the half
century culture of free and open communication in the scientific communities.” 212 A
survey of biotechnology firms done in the mid-1990’s supports Professor King’s
statement.213 The survey found that concerns about the effect that patents had on the
free flow of knowledge between researchers might be justified: “[a]mong surveyed
firms having research relations with academic institutions, 82% sometimes required
researchers ‘to keep information confidential until the filing of a patent application’
and 47% ‘occasionally required’ confidentiality beyond the time required to file a
patent.”214 The information that was withheld included experimental methods, future
experimental plans, and gene products, sequences, and locations.215
The
disincentives to sharing information slows an already painstakingly long process of
finding genes and their functions, which in turn retards medical progress.

210

Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1094.

211

Shaw, supra note 123, at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/feb2000.gene.htm.

212

Patenting Genes – Stifling Research and Jeopardising Healthcare, supra note 163, at 1.

213

David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in
Life Sciences—An Industry Survey, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 371 (1996). See Golden,
supra note 1, at 135.
214

Golden, supra note 1, at 135. Blumenthal, supra note 213, at 371.

215

Meredith Wadman, Commercial Interests Delay Publication, 379 Nature 574, 574
(1996). See Blumenthal, supra note 213, at 372. See Golden, supra note 1, at 135.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss2/6

22

2002-03]

DNA PATENTING AND ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE

275

Gene patents have also been responsible for shutting down laboratories working
at the forefront of genetics. In 1999, survey results indicated that one in four
laboratories stopped performing certain genetic tests because they received
notifications of patent restrictions or because of high licensing fees.216 Debra
Leonard, director of the Molecular Pathology program at the University of
Pennsylvania Health System, is accustomed to cease-and-desist orders against her
laboratory.217 The cease-and-desist orders prevent Leonard from conducting tests
she’s developed for a neurodegenerative condition of the cerebellum, hereditary
hemochromatosis, cystic fibrosis delta f508, and for Canavan’s disease.218 Another
lab at Penn that tests for BRCA1 has also been ordered to stop.219 This is “[b]ecause
other entities have patented the genes that carry these diseases, and they’ve adopted
restrictive licensure agreements permitting one, or at most a few laboratories to do
all testing involving these genes.”220 Jon F. Merz, an assistant professor of bioethics
at the University of Pennsylvania, has preliminary survey results showing that of
about 100 laboratories researching hemochromatosis, 20% did not develop a test in
part because the gene is patented.221 The labs closed because they did not want to
spend the valuable research time and money knowing that there was a chance they
would be shut down by patent holders.222
Exclusive licensing of patents can inhibit the progress of science because only a
limited number of researchers are using and testing the new information.223
Licensing, while not as prohibitive as exclusive licensing, can still retard new
information and technologies when it is cost prohibitive.224 Patent holders can refuse
to grant researchers licenses altogether, and when researchers are given the
opportunity to purchase licenses, the patent holders set the terms usually charging
“both an upfront usage fee and a per test fee, often at rates that small diagnostic
laboratories cannot afford.”225 Therefore, even if licensing is available, unreasonably
high fees can lead researchers to shut down their labs.226 Lab shut downs, like the
inability to gain access to the latest information, can result in a discovery taking
longer or not being made at all.
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One pharmaceutical firm, Merck & Co., has made the Merck Gene index free to
the public.227 The Merck Gene index is a gene library.228 Keith Elliston, associate
director of Merck's department of bioinformatics, is quoted as saying that this kind of
gene sequence data should be openly accessed because “it increases the probability
of breakthrough discoveries.”229 There is a question whether Merck’s release of the
information to the public will counteract the problems that are seen with gene
patents. It may be that if researchers use Merck's sequences and those sequences are
covered by previously filed patent applications, the scientists might be prevented
from using the Merck sequences for research without paying fees to the patent
holders.230 The availability of some public databases like Merck's does not
necessarily reduce the inhibition of research. The private databases are still more
valuable because they use both information that was gathered privately and whatever
information the public databases hold.231
C. Decreased Quality of Healthcare
Oftentimes when a gene is associated with a particular disease, scientists work to
develop a test that allows them to determine if an individual has the affected gene.
Labs spend years developing and validating tests for disease genes.232 They train
physicians, who will implement the tests in their practices, on how to administer the
tests, and how to evaluate the results. 233 Ultimately, the tests become “the standard
of medical practice.”234 With the availability of gene patents, some companies,
hospitals, and universities are patenting genes and the tests they have developed.
The patent holders then authorize a limited number of labs to perform the tests. Labs
that have been testing all along without licenses must cease testing and they are also
prohibited from answering questions that physicians may have about the tests
because they are not permitted to use the gene, even if they have their own tests.235
This was the case in the Canavan example.236
Exclusive licensing raises questions about the quality of testing and research.237
If only one or two labs are licensed to perform certain tests, there is never a chance
to do an objective quality control comparison with other researchers at different
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labs.238 Also, second opinions can be difficult to obtain when only a few labs test for
certain traits.239
Another impact of the exclusive licensing is the effect on physicians. Physicians
are the ones who will be interpreting the results of these tests. “The way physicians
learn how to use tests is to actually see tests and do tests and interpret them and study
them,” said Jonathan F. Tait, MD, PhD, associate professor and director of the
Molecular Diagnosis Laboratory at the University of Washington, Seattle.240 If all
the tests go to one lab, the ability to participate and learn from the tests is nearly
impossible, and in the end the patient suffers because the care is sub-optimal.
Disease gene patents prevent clinicians from practicing the best medicine.241
D. The Impact of the PTO’s Current Utility Standards
In February 2000, the PTO issued a patent to Human Genome Sciences
(hereinafter HGS)242 for the gene CCR5.243 HGS was issued a patent on the CCR5
gene, its protein, and fragments of DNA for locating the gene.244 The utility that
HGS described for CCR5 was that CCR5 was a receptor gene that binds protein
molecules termed “chemokines.”245 HGS’s patent application claimed that the
chemokines would be useful for treatments involving inflammation, immune
reactions, allergies, and arthritis.246 The patent application did not disclose the
function of CCR5’s particular protein product, although the patent on it was given to
HGS.247 The function of the CCR5 protein was later discovered by independent
researchers at the NIH.248 The NIH research showed that the CCR5 protein works as
a co-receptor in binding HIV.249 It is likely that this protein is necessary for the HIV
virus to be transmitted from one person to another.250 Independent researchers also
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discovered that the defective versions of CCR5 suppress HIV infection by preventing
the virus from attaching to cells.251
Despite the fact that HGS was not the one to discover the medically valuable
information about the CCR5 gene, and did no research to demonstrate its role in HIV
infection, they were still awarded the patent.252 HGS acknowledges that when they
applied for the patent they had no knowledge of the gene’s role in HIV infection.253
The patent allows HGS to determine who can use the gene to develop new AIDS
drugs.254 This could nullify any research done by the teams that actually found the
gene’s real use.255 The overall effect is that HGS can now exclude anyone, including
the NIH group, from using the gene in HIV treatment.256 Although HGS is making
the gene available to academic researchers at no cost, the developer of any
commercial product will owe them royalties.257
The PTO issued new utility guidelines in 2001 “with the intent of tightening the
standard and restricting the issuance of gene patents.”258 However, the NIH contends
that the new utility standards issued by the PTO do not do enough to prevent a
reoccurrence of the CCR5 situation.259 The HGS patent on the CCR5 gene illustrates
two of the main problems that can still occur under the Patent and Trademark
Office’s current utility criteria.
First, under the new guidelines only one utility has to be described. That utility
does not have to be the most medically relevant utility, and that one utility does not
even have to be for the gene and its corresponding products. The PTO openly
acknowledges that one function, and not necessarily the best or most useful function,
will meet the criteria for patentability.260 The requirement that only one utility needs
to be described in order to gain a patent on all of a gene’s functions makes the
patents extremely broad.261 The PTO is not opposed to broad genetic patents and has
stated that,
A patent on a composition gives exclusive rights to the composition for a
limited time, even if the inventor disclosed only a single use for the
composition. Thus, a patent granted on an isolated and purified DNA
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composition confers the right to exclude others from any method of using
that DNA composition, for up to twenty years from the filing date. This
result flows from the language of the statute.”262
If a subsequent researcher finds a new use for the patented DNA or gene, a
process patent can be issued; however, the holder of the process patent may still owe
the original patent holder royalty or licensing fees.263 The PTO posits that broad
patents encourage subsequent discoveries and promote progress and are one of the
ways in which the patentee can recoup costs.264 Although it is likely that broad
patents enable patent holders to recoup costs, these patents do not encourage
discoveries nor do they promote progress. Although HGS is allowing researchers to
use the CCR5 gene free of charge, this is not required by patent law. Rather, an
original patent holder has the ability to exclusively license and to set royalty fees at
any rate.
The second problem that arises from the current utility criteria is that the utility
can be speculative in nature. HGS determined that CCR5 would be useful as a
chemokine receptor by using homology studies.265 Homology studies determine
gene function by comparing the human gene sequence to gene sequences of other
species whose functions are already known.266 If there is enough homology between
the two gene sequences, then it is assumed that the genes function in the same way.
The PTO accepts homology-based assertions of utility, although some scientists
believe that homology studies are unpredictable.267 Many groups, such as Celera and
HGP, believe that a patent should not be given on a particular DNA sequence until
the applicant is able to clearly describe the gene's role.268 Utilities based on
homology can be incorrect and can prevent the most medically valuable function of a
gene from being discovered. CCR5 is an example where one research team
discovered a “function” based on a homology and then another publicly-funded team
discovered a true medically valuable function of the gene. DNA sequences that are
patented through homology patents could have “multiple unexplored functions.”269
These other functions are likely to remain unexplored because homology utilities can
be found very quickly.
The fact that one utility description is enough to get a patent that covers all of a
gene’s functions is detrimental to finding the best use for a gene which ultimately
effects the quality of public healthcare. Homology studies also decrease the quality
of healthcare by encouraging the quick patenting of genes without any demonstration
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of the benefits to the public, and by restricting researchers, who could develop
socially beneficial products, from having access to the genes.270
VI. AN APPROACH TO BALANCING THE INTERESTS
Since the Patent Act of 1952, the patent laws of the United States have remained
relatively unchanged.271 The few revisions that have been made were primarily “to
correct minor technical issues and to make the patent laws of the United States
consistent with various international treaty obligations.”272 In order for the current
problems of gene patenting to be addressed, Congress needs to amend the patent
laws.
The PTO is without authority to make the fundamental changes that are needed to
address the issues that gene patents raise. The role of the PTO is to interpret and
implement the federal statutes and guidelines.273 Likewise, the courts are not the
source of change in this area. First of all, patent suits concern infringement issues
not public policy, and the cost of going to court over a patent is extremely
expensive.274 Second, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court recognized
that it was not competent to hear arguments on the hazards of genetic research and
that the legislative and executive branches of government were the appropriate
audiences.275
There is precedent for Congress to change patent law when public health is at
stake. In 1996, Congress passed a law protecting physicians and institutions from
liability for infringing on patents that covered medical process such as surgical
incisions.276 This law was passed in response to the medical community’s concern
that the patents on medical procedures would decrease the quality of patient care
because the newest techniques could not be used without the threat of a potential
patent infringement lawsuit.277
The legislation does not eliminate patent
protection.278
Rather, it exempts certain medical practitioners from patent
infringement claims.279
Congress should adopt the American Medical Association’s (hereinafter AMA)
policy on gene patents. The AMA’s policy reads:
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AMA policy on gene patents is: (1) Patents on processes—for example,
processes used to isolate and purify gene sequences, genes and proteins,
or vehicles of gene therapy—do not raise the same ethical problems as
patents as the substances themselves and are thus preferable. (2)
Substance patents on purified proteins presents fewer ethical problems
than patents on genes or DNA sequences and are thus preferable. (3) The
AMA: (a) supports the concepts of gene patents only if the inventor has
demonstrated a practical, real world, specific and substantial use (credible
utility) for the sequence; (b) supports equitable access to licenses and
sublicenses of gene patents for diagnostic genetic tests to any Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA)-certified laboratory at a reasonable
royalty (c) supports the concept of gene patents only if the inventor has
demonstrated a practical use beyond merely being a tool for scientific
discovery, (d) recommends that the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing
consider the development of special guidelines for the licensing of human
gene-related patents as a way of promoting research and other benefits; (e)
encourages the DHHS as part of its regulatory oversight of genetic testing
to continue to monitor the impact of gene patenting and licensing
agreements on access to relevant medical care; and (f) encourages the
DHHS Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing to further
discuss what “credible utility” should refer to within the fields of
biotechnology. (4) One of the goals of genetic research is to achieve
better medical treatments and technologies. Granting patent protection
should not hinder this goal. Individuals or entities holding patents on
genetic material should not allow patents to languish and should negotiate
and structure licensing agreements in such a way as to encourage the
development of better medical technology.280
The AMA’s policy adequately addresses the major problems that result from gene
patents. Although the patentee will still hold the patent for twenty years, under the
AMA policy the monopoly given will resemble the kind of monopoly that was
intended to exist. In section 3(b), the AMA supports access to gene patents by all
certified laboratories at a reasonable cost. By requiring that licensing come at a
reasonable cost, laboratories will be able to continue their research, which means the
public will benefit from the results sooner. The reasonable cost to the lab can be
passed on to the consumer. In addition to advocating reasonable costs, Section 3(b)
prohibits exclusive licensing of gene patents. This will end the problems of
decreased quality and lab shut downs that exist with exclusive licensing.
Section 3(b) also addresses the problems that occur with the multiplicity of
patents. Laboratories seeking to use patented genes will still have to locate the
patent holders, but this effort will not be in vain because access will be guaranteed
for a reasonable royalty. While section 3(a) accepts the PTO’s revised utility
standards, section 3(f) encourages the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) to further examine what “credible utility” should mean in the area of
biotechnology. Further examination into defining utility may lead policy-makers to
280
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prohibit infringement actions against people who use patented genes to develop more
medically useful utilities. Section 3(e) encourages the DHHS to monitor the impact
of gene patents on medical care. This is extremely important since there are
divergent views on the topic and little empirical evidence. The DHHS is in a better
position than the PTO to investigate the impact of patents on healthcare because it
can enlist the NIH and other groups to help develop a well conceived study.
VII. CONCLUSION
Gene patents are needed as an incentive for biotech companies to develop
products for consumers.281 However, under the current patent law, biomedical
research is inhibited and the public is paying twice for biotech innovation. In order
to protect public health, Congress must amend the patent law. The best existing
model for legislative change has been proposed by the American Medical
Association. The AMA model addresses all of the public policy concerns, but still
allows biotech companies to hold gene patents.
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